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PRO-ARBITRATION POLICY IN THE AUSTRALIAN 
COURTS — THE END OF EISENWERK? 
Benjamin Hayward* 
ABSTRACT 
International arbitration is an important area of federal jurisdiction and federal 
legislative competence, and has attracted significant policy attention in Australia.  This 
paper undertakes a study of pro-arbitration judicial policy in recent arbitration-related 
Australian case law which touches upon the continuing applicability of the 
controversial 1999 Eisenwerk decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal.  Against this 
pro-arbitration judicial policy context, this paper reviews five Eisenwerk-related cases 
handed down between 2010 and 2012. It concludes that despite pro-arbitration judicial 
policy being embedded as a requirement of reasoning in decisions under the 
International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth), there is mixed evidence of such policy in the 
cases surveyed. This paper concludes that the extent to which this policy is evidenced 
largely corresponds with the degree to which contemporary decisions have departed 
from Eisenwerk. 
I INTRODUCTION 
There have been periods of lesser and periods of greater judicial and legislative support 
for the arbitral process.1 
International commercial arbitration is (subject to one's definition)2 a form of 
alternative dispute resolution. It is not, however, completely insulated from domestic 
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1  Gary Born, International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer, 2009) 64. 
2  Alternative dispute resolution sometimes refers to non-adjudicatory forms of dispute 
resolution, which excludes arbitration from its scope — see, eg, Tania Sourdin, Alternative 
Dispute Resolution (Thomson Reuters, 4th ed, 2012) 2–3 [1.10]. On the other hand, it has been 
remarked that 'arbitration is the usual method for the resolution of international 
commercial disputes'— Michael Pryles, 'The Case for International Arbitration' [2003] 
Yearbook of the Australian Mining and Petroleum Law Association 1, 4 (emphasis added). 
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judicial systems. A complex relationship exists between State courts and international 
commercial arbitration.3 This paper undertakes a study of pro-arbitration judicial 
policy in recent arbitration-related Australian case law which touches on the 
continuing applicability of Australian Granites Ltd v Eisenwerk Hensel Bayreuth Dipl-Ing 
Burkhardt GmbH4 ('Eisenwerk'). The Queensland Court of Appeal’s intervention into the 
arbitral process in Eisenwerk is one example of the interface between arbitration and the 
courts. 
Consideration of this issue is timely. Arbitration is commonly observed to be the 
'principal',5 'preferred'6 or 'normal'7 means of settling international commercial 
disputes. Empirical research conducted through the School of International Arbitration 
at Queen Mary, University of London supports these assertions. Its 2006 and 2008 
studies both reported higher preferences for international arbitration compared to 
transnational litigation,8 though the relatively narrower gap disclosed in the 2008 
study has been noted in the literature.9 Further, its 2010 study found that of the 68 per 
cent of respondent corporations having dispute resolution policies, 81 per cent 
involved 'a position to adopt arbitration rather than state court litigation'10 and for 10 
per cent the use of arbitration fell in the '[m]ust comply at all times' category.11 In the 
specific sale of goods context, the Global Sales Law Survey similarly concluded that 
international trade disputes are 'primarily a matter for arbitral tribunals'.12 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
3  Cf Westport Insurance Corporation v Gordian Runoff Ltd (2011) 244 CLR 239, 261–2 [19]–[20] 
(French CJ, Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ) — in the domestic arbitration context. 
4  [2001] 1 Qd R 461. 
5  Nigel Blackaby et al, Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (Oxford University 
Press, 5th ed, 2009) 1 [1.01], 31 [1.88]. 
6  Julian Lew, Loukas Mistelis and Stefan Kröll, Comparative International Commercial 
Arbitration (Kluwer, 2003) 5 [1.15]. 
7  Emmanuel Gaillard and John Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International 
Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer, 1999) 1. 
8  In the 2006 study, 73% of corporate respondents indicated a preference for international 
arbitration — School of International Arbitration, International Arbitration: Corporate 
Attitudes and Practices 2006 (2006) 5 [1.2] <http://www.arbitrationonline 
.org/docs/IAstudy_2006.pdf>. In the 2008 study, 44% of respondents indicated that 
arbitration was their most-used dispute resolution method as opposed to 41% most 
commonly using transnational litigation — School of International Arbitration, International 
Arbitration: Corporate Attitudes and Practices 2008 (2008) 5 [1] 
<http://www.arbitrationonline.org/docs/IAstudy_2008.pdf>. 
9  Lawrence Newman, 'Agreements to Arbitrate and the Predictability of Procedures' (2009) 
113 Penn State Law Review 1323, 1323. 
10  School of International Arbitration, 2010 International Arbitration Survey: Choices in 
International Arbitration (2010) 5 [1] <http://www.arbitrationonline.org/ 
docs/2010_InternationalArbitrationSurveyReport.pdf>.  
11  Ibid 6 [1]. 
12  Ingeborg Schwenzer and Christopher Kee, 'International Sales Law — The Actual Practice' 
(2011) 29 Penn State International Law Review 425, 437. 
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The federal government recognises that international commercial arbitration 
represents a 'market'.13 Mistelis suggests that attracting 'arbitration cases and 
arbitration work' to a jurisdiction 'is good for local lawyers [and] good for the local 
economies'.14 International arbitration has been described as 'the new black' in 
Australia15 and as one commentator observed, 'it is incontrovertible that international 
arbitration is an area of federal jurisdiction which is significant for Australia's national 
interest'.16 In his foreword to The International Arbitration Act 1974: A Commentary, 
Justice James Allsop goes so far as to describe that Act as 'one of Australia's most 
important pieces of legislation'.17 
When the topic of international commercial arbitration is addressed in the 
Australian context, reference is often made to Singapore and Hong Kong — both 
established international commercial arbitration centres in the Asia-Pacific region.18 
Pro-arbitration judicial policy is seen as a key aspect of Australia rising to the ranks of 
these neighbours. As noted by Megens and Cubitt: 
For Australia to truly rival Singapore and Hong Kong as the preferred seat for 
international arbitration in the Asia-Pacific region, there must exist a legislative 
framework that is tailored to international arbitration and a judicial system that provides 
support and consistency rather than interference.19 
This paper analyses the recent line of cases having a bearing on the continued 
applicability of Eisenwerk. In so doing, it reflects on those cases through the prism of 
pro-arbitration judicial policy and considers the extent to which manifestation of that 
policy has brought the Eisenwerk principle to its end. 
II THE 'WHO, WHY, WHAT, WHERE AND HOW' OF PRO-
ARBITRATION POLICY IN THE AUSTRALIAN COURTS 
What, then, is meant by pro-arbitration judicial policy? And why is it important? In 
this Part, pro-arbitration judicial policy is explained as a concept sourced to the federal 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
13  Robert McClelland, 'International Commercial Arbitration in Australia: More Effective and 
Certain' (Speech delivered at the International Commercial Arbitration: Efficient, Effective, 
Economical? conference, Melbourne, 4 December 2009). 
14  Loukas A Mistelis, 'Arbitral Seats — Choices and Competition' in Stefan Kröll et al (eds), 
International Arbitration and International Commercial Law: Synergy, Convergence and Evolution 
(Kluwer, 2011) 363, 379. 
15  Richard Garnett and Luke Nottage, 'The 2010 Amendments to the International Arbitration 
Act: A New Dawn for Australia?' (2011) 7 Asian International Arbitration Journal 29, 31. 
16  Albert Monichino, 'International Arbitration in Australia: The Need to Centralise Judicial 
Power' (2012) 86 Australian Law Journal 118, 131. 
17  Justice James Allsop, 'Foreword' in Malcolm Holmes and Chester Brown, The International 
Arbitration Act 1974: A Commentary (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2011) vii. 
18  See, eg, Albert Monichino, 'International Arbitration in Australia — 2010 / 2011 in Review' 
(2011) 22 Australasian Dispute Resolution Journal 215, 215. For examples of such references in 
the mainstream press, see Rachel Nickless, 'Rivalries Cost Business', The Australian Financial 
Review (Sydney), 21 October 2011, 40; Samantha Bowers, 'Aiming for an A in Arbitration', 
The Australian Financial Review (Sydney), 12 August 2011, 41. 
19  Peter Megens and Beth Cubitt, 'Emerging Trends in Judicial Approach to International 
Arbitration in Australia: The Winds of Change' (2011) 77 Arbitration 33, 41 (emphasis 
added). 
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government's policy platform, the purposive approach to statutory interpretation, the 
core ideas underpinning the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards20 ('New York Convention') and aspects of the promotional and 
operational work of the Australian judiciary. 
In essence, this paper uses the term pro-arbitration judicial policy as a term of art — 
describing a judicial approach to arbitration-related case law which is international in 
perspective and moreover sophisticated, to the point that the court's demonstrated and 
high-level understanding of the arbitral process truly supports rather than frustrates it. 
Pro-arbitration judicial policy is not merely minimal court intervention21 — rather, 
contextually appropriate court intervention.22 
A Federal government policy — promoting Australia as a regional centre for 
international commercial arbitration 
Pro-arbitration policy (in a general sense) is an element of the current federal 
government's policy platform. Overall 'low levels of [international commercial 
arbitration] activity' has been a matter of 'concern' amongst Australian policy makers.23 
The federal government's policy, by way of response, is to promote Australia as a 
regional centre for international commercial arbitration. 
This policy position had its genesis in the Attorney-General's announcement on 21 
November 2008 of a review of the International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) (the 'IAA'). 
This is the key piece of federal legislation regulating international commercial 
arbitration in Australia. At this time, the Attorney-General stated that the federal 
government was 'committed to developing Australia as a regional hub for 
international commercial dispute resolution'.24 The Discussion Paper released that day 
asserted that '[t]his review will ensure that the [IAA] best supports international 
arbitration in Australia'.25 
To this end, the International Arbitration Amendment Act 2010 (Cth) was passed, 
making several amendments to the IAA. In the same year, the federal government 
(with the New South Wales government) assisted in establishing the Australian 
International Disputes Centre in Sydney.26 More recently, the International Arbitration 
Regulations 2011 (Cth) have built upon the 2010 legislative reforms by nominating the 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
20  Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, opened for 
signature 19 June 1958, 330 UNTS 38 (entered into force 7 June 1959). 
21  Cf Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Co v Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Government 
of Pakistan [2011] 1 AC 763, 835–7 [99]–[104] (Lord Collins). 
22  Cf Michael Kerr, 'Arbitration and the Courts: The UNCITRAL Model Law' (1985) 34 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1, 16. 
23  Luke Nottage and Richard Garnett, 'Introduction' in Luke Nottage and Richard Garnett 
(eds), International Arbitration in Australia (The Federation Press, 2010) 1, 11. 
24  Robert McClelland, 'Australian Government Moves to Modernise International 
Commercial Arbitration' (Media Release, 21 November 2008). 
25  Attorney-General's Department, Review of the International Arbitration Act 1974 — Discussion 
Paper (Discussion Paper, 21 November 2008) [4]. 
26  Australian International Disputes Centre, About Us <http://www.disputescentre.com.au 
/About-Us>. The AIDC currently houses several Australian arbitration bodies — ACICA, 
the Australian branch of CIArb, the Australian Maritime and Transport Arbitration 
Commission, and the Australian Commercial Disputes Centre. 
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Australian Centre for International Commercial Arbitration as an appointing authority 
under the IAA.27 
This activity represents a form of pro-arbitration policy at a political level. 
However, what is of more imminent interest for the purposes of this paper is the extent 
to which judicial decision-making in arbitration-related case law is consistent with the 
government's policy position. It is this degree of consistency which will inform this 
paper's assessment of pro-arbitration judicial policy as that term is described above. 
B The International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) — A purposive interpretation 
It might be queried why this case law should be consistent with government policy. 
The strict separation of judicial power from the executive and the Parliament is a key 
feature of the separation of powers in Australia as expounded in the Boilermakers' 
Case.28 The starting point for this analysis is the interpretative methodology that must 
be applied by the courts to the IAA. An analysis of this methodology confirms that pro-
arbitration judicial policy, understood as courts supporting the arbitral process by 
demonstrating an internationally minded and sophisticated understanding of 
arbitration, is a legitimate element of legal reasoning in the application of that statute. 
It is proper for Australian courts to approach arbitration-related litigation on the 
basis of pro-arbitration judicial policy because the IAA is facilitative legislation29 and 
the purposive approach to statutory interpretation requires interpretation against that 
context. The purposive approach also stands to secure more consistent interpretation 
of the IAA across the various State and federal courts having jurisdiction with respect 
to the Act. Such consistency has been emphasised by the High Court in the 'very 
stringent test'30 explained in Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd31 — whereby 
intermediate courts 'should not depart from decisions … in another jurisdiction on the 
interpretation of Commonwealth legislation … unless they are convinced that the 
interpretation is plainly wrong'.32 
The purposive approach to statutory interpretation is, at the Commonwealth level, 
embodied in the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 15AA. According to this provision, 
‘the interpretation that would best achieve the purpose or object of the Act (whether or 
not that purpose or object is expressly stated in the Act) is to be preferred to each other 
interpretation.’  Applying this provision to the IAA, the Act's purposes should inform 
its construction. Following the coming into force of the International Arbitration 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
27  International Arbitration Regulations 2011 (Cth) reg 4. 
28  See generally R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers' Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254, affd 
Attorney-General (Cth) v The Queen (1957) 95 CLR 529. Cf TCL Air Conditioner (Zhongshan) Co 
Ltd v Judges of the Federal Court of Australia (2013) 295 ALR 596. 
29  Uganda Telecom Ltd v Hi-Tech Telecom Pty Ltd [No 2] (2011) 277 ALR 441, 443 [12] (Foster J). 
30  Chief Justice Patrick Keane, 'Judicial Support for Arbitration in Australia' (2010) 34 
Australian Bar Review 1, 5. 
31  (2007) 230 CLR 89. 
32  Ibid 151–2 [135] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ). 
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Amendment Act 2010 (Cth) on 6 July 2010,33 these purposes are now given statutory 
basis in an objects section. Pursuant to the new post-amendment IAA s 2D:34 
The objects of this Act are: 
(a) to facilitate international trade and commerce by encouraging the use of arbitration 
as a method of resolving disputes; and 
(b) to facilitate the use of arbitration agreements made in relation to international trade 
and commerce; and 
(c) to facilitate the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards made in relation to 
international trade and commerce; and 
(d) to give effect to Australia's obligations under the [New York Convention]; and 
(e) to give effect to the [United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
('UNCITRAL') Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration35 (the 'Model Law')] 
… 
However while the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 15AA would ordinarily 
underpin the purposive interpretation of federal legislation, in the case of the IAA the 
legislature has gone further and has enacted specific interpretative rules. The 
International Arbitration Amendment Act 2010 (Cth) inserted a new s 39 into the IAA.36 
That provision requires courts to consider the IAA's objects when undertaking various 
tasks under the Act.37 These tasks include deciding whether to enforce an award,38 
performing functions pursuant to art 6 of the Model Law39 and performing any other 
functions with respect to the IAA, the Model Law, or any agreement or award to which 
the IAA applies.40 These tasks also include interpretation of the IAA and the Model 
Law,41 and the interpretation of an agreement or award to which the IAA applies.42 
Further, courts are required not only to consider the IAA's objects but also take into 
account two further 'fact[s]'43 — that 'arbitration is an efficient, impartial, enforceable 
and timely method by which to resolve commercial disputes',44 and that 'awards are 
intended to provide certainty and finality'.45 These two considerations, as well as all 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
33  International Arbitration Amendment Act 2010 (Cth) s 2. For the specific amending clause — 
see sch 1 cl 1. 
34  A sixth objects paragraph refers to implementation of the ICSID Convention, though this is 
not relevant to the international commercial arbitration context of this paper — 
International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) s 2D(f). 
35  United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration, adopted 11 December 1985, as amended by Report of the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law on the Work of its Thirty-Ninth Session, UN GAOR, 61st 
sess, Supp No 17, UN Doc A/61/17 (19 June – 7 July 2006) annex I 56–60. 
36  International Arbitration Amendment Act 2010 (Cth) sch 1 cl 26. 
37  International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) s 39(2)(a). See also ESCO Corporation v Bradken 
Resources Pty Ltd (2011) 282 ALR 282, 294 [64]. 
38  International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) s 39(1)(a)(i)–(iv). 
39  Ibid s 39(1)(a)(v). 
40  Ibid s 39(1)(a)(vi)–(vii). 
41  Ibid s 39(1)(b). 
42  Ibid s 39(1)(c). 
43  Ibid s 39(2)(b). 
44  Ibid s 39(2)(b)(i). 
45  Ibid s 39(2)(b)(ii). 
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five objects contained in IAA s 2D that are relevant to international commercial 
arbitration, reflect concerns to promote and facilitate international commercial 
arbitration. As explained by Foster J in the Federal Court case of Uganda Telecom Ltd v 
Hi-Tech Telecom Pty Ltd:46 
The whole rationale of the Act, and thus the public policy of Australia, is to enforce such 
awards wherever possible in order to uphold contractual arrangements entered into in 
the course of international trade, in order to support certainty and finality in international 
dispute resolution and in order to meet the other objects specified in s 2D of the Act.47 
By broadening the range of considerations beyond the IAA's objects per se, and 
requiring courts to take them into account in relation to functions other than the 
interpretation of the IAA, the new IAA s 39 operates as an extension on the purposive 
approach that would otherwise apply by virtue of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) 
s 15AA. It thereby embeds pro-arbitration judicial policy as a legitimate element of 
judicial reasoning in the application of the IAA. In applying the IAA, courts are legally 
required to approach it in a way that is internationally-minded and facilitates 
arbitration. A sophisticated understanding of arbitration itself is integral to satisfying 
this requirement. 
An additional layer of analysis also supports the use of pro-arbitration judicial 
policy under Australian law. The IAA implements the terms of the New York 
Convention into domestic law.48 The Convention contains mechanisms designed to 
ensure the enforceability of international arbitration agreements49 and awards.50 It has 
been described by Wetter as 'the single most important pillar on which the edifice of 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
46  (2011) 277 ALR 415. 
47  Ibid 436 [126]. 
48  The analysis which follows is based on the High Court's decision in Applicant A which is, 
by its terms, a decision relevant to international treaties. However it is not entirely 
irrelevant in this regard to note that the Model Law is given effect by the IAA and has a close 
interrelationship with the New York Convention — see Resolution Approving the Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration of the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law – UNCITRAL, GA Res 72, UN GAOR, 40th sess, 112th plen mtg, UN Doc A/RES/40/72 
(11 December 1985) [4]; Revised Articles of the Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, and the 
Recommendation Regarding the Interpretation of Article II, Paragraph 2, and Article VII, 
Paragraph I, of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 
Done at New York, 10 June 1985, GA Res 33, UN GAOR, 61st sess, 64th plen mtg, UN Doc 
A/RES/61/33 (4 December 2006) Preamble para 6; Comandate Marine Corp v Pan Australia 
Shipping Pty Ltd (2006) 157 FCR 45, 94–6 [192]–[193] (Allsop J). See also International 
Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) s 17(1). 
49  New York Convention art II. Pursuant to art II(1) of the New York Convention, the courts of 
Contracting States are required to recognise arbitration agreements and pursuant to art 
II(3) of the New York Convention they must (at the request of a party) refer matters within 
the scope of valid arbitration agreements back to arbitration. 
50  Ibid arts III–IV. Article III of the New York Convention requires the courts of Contracting 
States to recognise international arbitration awards as binding and enforce them; art IV 
concerns evidentiary requirements for enforcement; and arts V–VI concern the grounds on 
which recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards may be denied or adjourned. 
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international arbitration rests',51 while Lord Mustill has gone so far as to suggest that it 
'perhaps could lay claim to be the most effective instance of international legislation in 
the entire history of commercial law'.52 As at 10 May 2013, the New York Convention 
boasts 149 Contracting States, with Lichtenstein, Tajikstan, Sao Tome and Principe, and 
Myanmar most recently acceding on 7 July 2011, 14 August 2012, 20 November 2012 
and 16 April 2013 respectively.53 Because '[t]he Act is intended to give effect to the 
[New York] Convention' it 'must be interpreted in light of the Convention'.54 
The IAA sets out the Convention in its sch 1, but unlike the Model Law, it is not 
simply given 'the force of law in Australia'55 by reference. Instead, the Convention's 
terms are implemented by Part II of the Act. Pursuant to the High Court's decision in 
Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs56 ('Applicant A'), where 
domestic legislation implements the terms of a convention, the rules of interpretation 
contained in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties57 (the 'VCLT') should be 
applied rather than those found in the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth).58 As explained 
by Brennan CJ:59 
If a statute transposes the text of a treaty or a provision of a treaty into the statute so as to 
enact it as part of domestic law, the prima facie legislative intention is that the transposed 
text should bear the same meaning in the domestic statute as it bears in the treaty. To 
give it that meaning, the rules applicable to the interpretation of treaties must be applied 
to the transposed text and the rules generally applicable to the interpretation of domestic 
statutes give way.60 
Pursuant to art 31(1) of the VCLT (with emphasis added), '[a] treaty shall be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose'. Further, art 32 
of the VCLT provides that recourse may be had to supplementary materials to either 
confirm the meaning that would result from an application of art 31 of the VCLT, or in 
circumstances where that interpretation 'leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure' or 
'leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable'. As further explored in 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
51  J Gillis Wetter, 'The Present Status of the International Court of Arbitration of the ICC: An 
Appraisal' (1990) 1 American Review of International Arbitration 91, 93. 
52  Lord Michael Mustill, 'Arbitration: History and Background' (1989) 6(2) Journal of 
International Arbitration 43, 49. 
53  UNCITRAL, Status: 1958 — Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards <http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention 
_status.html>. 
54  Uganda Telecom Ltd v Hi-Tech Telecom Pty Ltd (2011) 277 ALR 415, 421 [21] (Foster J). See also 
ESCO Corporation v Bradken Resources Pty Ltd (2011) 282 ALR 282, 295 [73] (Foster J). 
55  International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) s 16(1). 
56  (1997) 190 CLR 225. 
57  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 
(entered into force 27 January 1980). See, eg, International Council for Commercial 
Arbitration (ed), ICCA's Guide to the Interpretation of the 1958 New York Convention (ICCA, 
2011) 12–16. 
58  Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 225, 230–1 (Brennan 
CJ), 239–40 (Dawson J), 251–3 (McHugh J), 277 (Gummow J), 292, 294–5 (Kirby J). 
59  Brennan CJ was in the minority, however all five justices agreed on the interpretative 
principle relevant here. 
60  Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 225, 230–1. 
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Section C below, the New York Convention's purposes are decidedly pro-arbitration. 
Thus, a VCLT-interpretation (in accordance with the High Court's directive in Applicant 
A) would also support the use of pro-arbitration judicial policy in Australian 
arbitration-related case law. 
C The New York Convention — pro-enforcement bias at the heart of the global 
arbitration regime 
Section B explored the interpretative methodologies surrounding the IAA and why 
these should lead to the use of pro-arbitration judicial policy in Australia. However, 
the analysis need not be so parochial. Pro-arbitration judicial policy is a phenomenon 
rooted in the very essence of the modern legal framework for regulating international 
commercial arbitration, built around the New York Convention. 
The New York Convention's importance in the present context lies in the fact that its 
purposes are 'to promote international commerce and the settlement of international 
disputes through arbitration'61 and 'to make it easier to enforce foreign awards'.62 Such 
purposes are reflected in the case law. To take just one example, in Uganda Telecom Ltd 
v Hi-Tech Telecom Pty Ltd [No 2],63 Foster J noted that '[t]he 1958 New York Convention is 
intended to facilitate the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in 
Convention countries'.64 
These purposes manifest themselves in what has been termed the New York 
Convention's 'pro-enforcement bias'.65 This is a phrase employed not only in the 
literature but also in local66 and international67 case law. This pro-enforcement bias is 
not strictly identical to pro-arbitration judicial policy as that term is used in this paper 
— the latter (as described above) is wider; the former is concerned with the specific 
issue of promoting the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. As 
explained in the US decision of Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co Inc v Societe Generale 
de L'Industrie du Papier (RAKTA),68 the 'basic effort' of the New York Convention is 'to 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
61  International Council for Commercial Arbitration (ed), above n 57, 14–15. 
62  Jan Paulsson, 'The Case for Disregarding LSAS (Local Standard Annulments) Under the 
New York Convention' (1996) 7 American Review of International Arbitration 99, 104. 
63  (2011) 277 ALR 441. 
64  Ibid 443 [12]. 
65  See, eg, International Council for Commercial Arbitration (ed), above n 57, 15. 
66  See, eg, Castel Electronics Pty Ltd v TCL Air Conditioner (Zhongshan) Co Ltd [No 2] [2012] FCA 
1214 (2 November 2012) [30], [34], [39], [50], [55], [183] (Murphy J); Traxys Europe SA v Balaji 
Coke Industry Pvt Ltd [No 2] (2012) 201 FCR 535, 555 [90] (Foster J); ESCO Corporation v 
Bradken Resources Pty Ltd (2011) 282 ALR 282, 298 [85] (Foster J). 
67  See, eg, Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co Inc v Societe Generale de L'Industrie du Papier 
(RAKTA), 508 F 2d 969, 973 (2nd Cir, 1974). See also Kahara Bodas Co LLC v Perusahaan 
Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 364 F 3d 274, 306 (5th Cir, 2004) (citing the 
Parsons decision) and the recent Australian case of Uganda Telecom Ltd v Hi-Tech Telecom Pty 
Ltd (2011) 277 ALR 415, 436 [129] (Foster J) (citing Kahara Bodas). Cf Dallah Real Estate and 
Tourism Holding Co v Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Government of Pakistan [2011] 1 AC 
763, 836 [101] (Lord Collins) — referring to 'a "pro-enforcement" policy' under the New York 
Convention. 
68  508 F 2d 969 (2nd Cir, 1974). 
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remove preexisting obstacles to enforcement'.69 The Convention's pro-enforcement bias 
is often cited in the context of narrowly reading the art V New York Convention grounds 
for refusing recognition and enforcement70 and in particular the public policy 
exception.71 It also manifests itself in the proposition that awards are 'prima facie liable 
to be enforced'72 under the New York Convention regime. However, reasoning which 
utilises the narrower pro-enforcement bias concept is necessarily consistent with the 
idea of pro-arbitration judicial policy. To borrow terminology from the criminal law 
field, it might be called a 'lesser included'.73 
The legal basis for Section B's analysis lay in Australian statutory interpretation 
methodologies. In discussing the legal basis for the New York Convention's pro-
enforcement bias, reference is often made to the VCLT. The substance of arts 31(1) and 
32 of the VCLT were introduced in Section B. Both provisions ostensibly support a pro-
enforcement bias interpretation of the New York Convention. 
The problem in a formal sense with this analysis is that it overlooks the VCLT's 
non-retroactivity. Pursuant to art 4 of the VCLT, its rules 'appl[y] only to treaties which 
are concluded by States after the entry into force of the present Convention with regard 
to such States'. The VCLT came into force on 27 January 1980. However, the New York 
Convention was opened for signature on 19 June 1958 and came into force on 7 June 
1959. Therefore, strictly, the VCLT is irrelevant to the New York Convention's 
interpretation at international law. 
Nevertheless, the necessity of interpreting the Convention in light of its pro-
enforcement bias is confirmed through an alternate avenue of analysis — customary 
international law. The first part of art 4 of the VCLT reads '[w]ithout prejudice to the 
application of any rules set forth in the present Convention to which treaties would be 
subject under international law independently of the Convention …' The interpretative 
rules in arts 31 and 32 of the VCLT are in fact codifications of the principles otherwise 
applicable at customary international law.74 Thus while arts 31 and 32 of the VCLT are 
strictly inapplicable in themselves, the rules they embody apply and exist 
independently of their codification in treaty form. The position remains that the New 
York Convention should be interpreted according to its pro-enforcement bias (which is 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
69  Ibid 973. See also Uganda Telecom Ltd v Hi-Tech Telecom Pty Ltd [No 2] (2011) 277 ALR 441, 
443 [12] (Foster J). 
70  See, eg, International Council for Commercial Arbitration (ed), above n 57, 14–15. See also 
Castel Electronics Pty Ltd v TCL Air Conditioner (Zhongshan) Co Ltd [No 2] [2012] FCA 1214 (2 
November 2012) [55], [183] (Murphy J). 
71  See, eg, Castel Electronics Pty Ltd v TCL Air Conditioner (Zhongshan) Co Ltd [No 2] [2012] FCA 
1214 (2 November 2012) [50] (Murphy J); Traxys Europe SA v Balaji Coke Industry Pvt Ltd [No 
2] (2012) 201 FCR 535, 555 [90] (Foster J); Uganda Telecom Ltd v Hi-Tech Telecom Pty Ltd 
(2011) 277 ALR 415, 439 [132] (Foster J); Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co Inc v Societe 
Generale de L'Industrie du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F 2d 969, 973 (2nd Cir, 1974). 
72  ESCO Corporation v Bradken Resources Pty Ltd (2011) 282 ALR 282, 292 [53] (Foster J) — in 
the context of the New York Convention's implementation in Australia through the IAA. 
73  In the criminal law context, a 'lesser included' offence is '[a] crime that is composed of 
some, but not all, of the elements of a more serious crime and … is necessarily committed 
in carrying out the greater crime' — Bryan Garner (ed), Black's Law Dictionary (West, 9th ed, 
2009) 1187. 
74  Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 225, 294 (Kirby J). 
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necessarily consistent with courts applying pro-arbitration judicial policy as defined 
above). 
D The Australian judiciary — spreading the good word 
Reorienting the analysis away from judicial decision-making itself, pro-arbitration 
judicial policy is reflected in the extra-judicial activities of a growing number of 
Australian judges as well as in the organisational structures becoming embedded 
within the Australian courts. 
Some members of the judiciary have expressed concern at recent civil procedure 
reforms which seek to entrench alternative dispute resolution ('ADR') in the dispute 
resolution process.75 Through the Civil Dispute Resolution Act 2011 (Cth), parties to 
disputes in the Federal Court of Australia and the Federal Circuit Court76 are required 
to each file a 'genuine steps statement'77 which outlines 'the steps that have been taken 
to try to resolve the issues in dispute between the applicant and the respondent in the 
proceedings' or alternatively 'the reasons why no such steps were taken'.78 The 
intention behind these procedures is to encourage dispute resolution outside of formal 
court structures79 and '[i]n many cases, some form of ADR would be a genuine step 
appropriate for parties to consider'.80 Critics have queried the utility of the legislation 
— with Justice Steven Rares of the Federal Court asking '[w]hy should people be 
stopped from coming to court because some law says you're not entitled to it' and 
noting 'particularly useless' disputes that can arise over what a genuine steps 
statement is.81 
Such concern has not surfaced with respect to promoting the arbitration of 
international commercial disputes. Australian judges have instead actively supported 
development of the local international commercial arbitration market. Historically 
jealous guardians of their jurisdiction,82 judges now appreciate the importance of an 
integrated dispute resolution framework83 and the practical advantages obtained by 
diverting some disputes out of the court system.84 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
75  See, eg, the comments of Justice Steven Rares quoted in Stephanie Quine, Mediation Orders 
Could Limit Access to Justice (14 June 2012) Lawyers Weekly 
<http://www.lawyersweekly.com.au/news/mediation-orders-could-limit-access-to-
justice>. 
76  Both Courts are within the exhaustive definition of 'eligible court' under the Act — Civil 
Dispute Resolution Act 2011 (Cth) s 5. 
77  Ibid ss 6, 7 (with respect to applicants and respondents, respectively). 
78  Ibid ss 6(2)(a)–(b) (with respect to applicants). Respondents' statements must either indicate 
agreement with the applicants' statement or 'the respect in which, and reasons why, the 
respondent disagrees' — ibid s 7(2). 
79  Explanatory Memorandum, Civil Dispute Resolution Bill 2010 (Cth) 2. 
80  Ibid 6 [12]. See also Harry Orr Hobbs, 'The Dispute Resolution Act 2011 (Cth) and the 
Meaning of "Genuine Steps": Formalising the Common Law Requirement of "Good Faith"' 
(2012) 23 Australasian Dispute Resolution Journal 249, 251. 
81  Quine, above n 75. 
82  See, eg, the famous remarks of Scrutton LJ that '[t]here must be no Alsatia in England 
where the King's writ does not run' — Czarnikow v Roth, Schmidt and Company [1922] 2 KB 
478, 488. 
83  The Supreme Court of Victoria, for example, 'sees itself as a … real partner with the 
providers of … ADR services' — Chief Justice Marilyn Warren, 'Remarks at the 
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It is therefore unsurprising that a number of prominent Australian judges actively 
promote the idea of international commercial arbitration in Australia through 
seminars, speeches and conference presentations around the world. To take just a few 
examples, Chief Justice Marilyn Warren and Justice Clyde Croft, both of the Supreme 
Court of Victoria, have acted in this capacity over recent years,85 as has the recently-
appointed High Court Justice Patrick Keane in his former office as Chief Justice of the 
Federal Court.86 
In addition, international commercial arbitration is being actively facilitated by 
Australian courts through their organisational structures. At issue here is the 
development of specialised arbitration lists dealing with international commercial 
arbitration matters, such as the 'benchmark'87 List G for 'arbitration proceedings' 
established by the Victorian Supreme Court's Practice Note No 2 of 2010.88 
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International Commercial Arbitration Conference — The Victorian Supreme Court's 
Perspective on Arbitration' (Speech delivered at the International Commercial Arbitration: 
Efficient, Effective, Economical? conference, Melbourne, 4 December 2009) 
<http://www.supremecourt.vic.gov.au/resources/54c95bcf-0886-4df2-882c-f4d5fc679eaa 
/remarks+at+the+icac_4.12.09.pdf>. 
84  Lord Cooke has referred to the 'gratitude' of courts towards arbitration in the face of 'the 
pressures of judicial workloads' — Lord Robin Cooke, 'Party Autonomy' (1999) 30 Victoria 
University of Wellington Law Review 257, 259. Similarly, Lalive refers to 'a kind of "division of 
labor" between States … and private international arbitration' — Pierre Lalive, 'Arbitration 
— The Civilized Solution' (1998) 16 ASA Bulletin 483, 484. Cf Westport Insurance Corporation 
v Gordian Runoff Ltd (2011) 244 CLR 239, 288 [111] (Heydon J) — in the context of domestic 
commercial arbitration. 
85  See, eg, Chief Justice Marilyn Warren, 'Australia as a "Safe and Neutral" Arbitration Seat' 
(Speech delivered at the ACICA 'The Australian Option' Chinese tour, Shanghai and 
Beijing, 6–7 June 2012) <http://www.supremecourt.vic.gov.au/resources/f532d1a7-b20c-
499d-9b5d-8d2d07b03cb7/nternational+arbitration.pdf>; Warren, 'Conference Remarks', 
above n 83; Justice Clyde Croft, 'Commercial Arbitration in Australia: The Past, the Present 
and the Future' (Paper presented at the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, London, 25 May 
2011) <http://www.supremecourt.vic.gov.au/resources/28b9b282-7aa9-492f-a1b6-
cbc3745993a2 /chartered_institute_paper-justice_croft.pdf>; Justice Clyde Croft, 'The 
Supreme Court of Victoria's Arbitration List and its Role Within Australia's Arbitration 
Framework' (Paper presented at the ICC International Court of Arbitration, Paris, 23 May 
2011) <http://www.supremecourt.vic.gov.au/resources/61880020-39a2-4fd3-a69f-
b12273890a7d/icc_aal_paper-justice_croft.pdf>; Justice Clyde Croft, 'The Development of 
Australia as an Arbitral Seat — A Victorian Supreme Court Perspective' (Paper presented 
at the ICCA 50th Anniversary Conference, Geneva, 19–20 May 2011) 
<http://www.supremecourt.vic.gov.au/resources/c544391d-f623-4d8f-86b9-333aa2af3186 
/icca_paper-justice_croft-270411.pdf>. 
86  See, eg, Chief Justice Patrick Keane, 'The Prospects for International Arbitration in 
Australia' (Speech delivered at the 6th Annual AMTAC Address, Brisbane, 25 September 
2012) <http://www.amtac.org.au/assets/media/AMAMTACAddressKeaneCJ25 
September-2012.pdf>. 
87  Monichino, 'The Need to Centralise', above n 16, 127. 
88  Supreme Court of Victoria, Practice Note No 2 of 2010 — Arbitration Business, 17 December 
2009, 7 [16] <http://www.supremecourt.vic.gov.au/resources/4e194d3d-c8a0-4944-966a-
452a420daa87/no._2_of_2010_-_arbitration_business.pdf>. 
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The rationale for arbitration lists lies in the observation that 'by having all 
arbitration matters brought in a specialist list … and heard by select judges 
experienced in arbitration, a body of jurisprudence will develop which is consistent, 
reliable and arbitration friendly'.89 Croft J of the Supreme Court of Victoria identifies 
several benefits of specialist arbitration lists, namely that: 
 courts with specialist lists are 'likely to be more aware of the specific issues 
that arise in the arbitration context'; 
 'a consistent body of arbitration related decisions can be developed by judges 
that have an interest and expertise in arbitration'; and 
 the 'procedures to be applied [can be made] clear and easily accessible'.90 
It can thus be seen that the existence of and justification for specialised arbitration lists 
is closely tied in with the execution of pro-arbitration judicial policy as that term is 
described as an element of legal reasoning in Sections B and C above. 
III EISENWERK, THE MODEL LAW AND 'OPTING OUT' 
Manifestation of the pro-arbitration judicial policy analysed in Part II, with respect to 
case law having a bearing on the continued applicability of Eisenwerk, is assessed in 
Part IV. Before that assessment is undertaken, some remarks can be made about 
Eisenwerk, the Model Law and the idea of 'opting out'. 
Eisenwerk was a decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal handed down in 1999, 
though it was not reported in the Queensland Reports until 2001. The case was highly 
controversial.91 It involved application of a now-superseded provision of the IAA — 
the old IAA s 21. This paper refers to this provision as the 'old' IAA s 21 to distinguish 
it from IAA s 21 as currently in force following the passage of the International 
Arbitration Amendment Act 2010 (Cth). 
The old IAA s 21 provided as follows: 
If the parties to an arbitration agreement have (whether in the agreement or in any other 
document in writing) agreed that any dispute that has arisen or may arise between them 
is to be settled otherwise than in accordance with the Model Law, the Model Law does not 
apply in relation to the settlement of that dispute. 
As a result of IAA s 16(1), the Model Law is given 'the force of law in Australia'. 
Therefore, considering the effect of IAA s 16(1) together with its old s 21, the Model Law 
operated as would be described by the law and economics movement as a set of 
'default rules'.92 The Model Law provided a default regulatory regime for international 
commercial arbitrations seated in Australia. However, it was open to the parties to 
agree (in writing) to subject themselves to a different body of law to govern the 
arbitration. 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
89  Megens and Cubitt, 'Emerging Trends', above n 19, 42 (emphasis added). 
90  Croft, 'The Development of Australia as an Arbitral Seat', above n 85, 13–14. 
91  Peter Megens and Beth Cubitt, 'Arbitrators' Perspective: The Evolving Face of International 
Arbitration — The Past, the Present and the Future' (2010) 13 International Arbitration Law 
Review 1, 5; Megens and Cubitt, 'Emerging Trends', above n 19, 33–4. 
92  See generally Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, 'Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An 
Economic Theory of Default Rules' (1989–1990) 99 Yale Law Journal 87. 
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There is nothing inherently insidious about the operation of IAA s 16(1) in 
conjunction with its old s 21 per se. To the contrary — procedural flexibility is a 
hallmark feature of international commercial arbitration. Thus the similar opt-out 
mechanism in Singapore's arbitration legislation was amended, rather than discarded, 
after a controversial and Eisenwerk-like interpretation in John Holland Pty Ltd v Toyo 
Engineering Corp (Japan).93 The importance of procedural flexibility is recognised not 
only in the international commercial arbitration literature but is also empirically 
confirmed by research conducted through the School of International Arbitration. Its 
2006 study found that procedural flexibility was 'the most widely recognised 
advantage' of arbitration amongst its respondents.94 Similarly, the School's 2008 study 
found that procedural flexibility was an advantage of arbitration that 'most counsel 
spoke of'.95 Further, the Redfern & Hunter commentary specifically adverts to the 
possibility that parties to an international commercial arbitration seated in one State 
may wish to subject themselves to a foreign lex arbitri — however unwise or 
inadvisable such a decision might be.96 Opt-out mechanisms exist in the arbitration 
laws of other prominent arbitral seats in the region, such as Singapore (as mentioned 
above),97 and the current lack of an opt-out provision in the IAA was recently noted by 
Chief Justice Patrick Keane of the Federal Court at the 6th Annual AMTAC Address.98 
The reason that Eisenwerk 'caused instant consternation'99 throughout the 
Australian arbitration community was not so much a consequence of these provisions' 
existence, but rather the interpretation Eisenwerk placed on the old IAA s 21. Applying 
that provision, Eisenwerk held that 'by expressly opting for one well-known form of 
arbitration, the parties sufficiently showed an intention not to adopt or be bound by 
any quite different system of arbitration, such as the Model Law'.100 The 'form of 
arbitration' referred to in Eisenwerk was the parties' adoption of the ICC Arbitration 
Rules.101 Constitutionally speaking, the activation of the old IAA s 21 in these 
circumstances meant that the Model Law was displaced without the selection of an 
alternative lex arbitri; the relevant State or Territory Uniform Commercial Arbitration Act 
would no longer be suppressed by the operation of s 109 of the Commonwealth 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
93  [2001] 2 SLR 262. See International Arbitration Act (Singapore, cap 143A, 2002 rev ed) s 15(2). 
94  School of International Arbitration, Corporate Attitudes 2006, above n 8, 6 [2.2]. 
95  School of International Arbitration, Corporate Attitudes 2008, above n 8, 5. 
96  Blackaby et al, above n 5, 185–6 [3.63]–[3.66]. See also Naviera Amazonica Peruana SA v 
Compania Internacional de Seguros del Peru [1988] 1 Lloyd's Rep 116, 120 (Kerr LJ) — quoted 
at 186 [3.66]. 
97  International Arbitration Act (Singapore, cap 143A, 2002 rev ed) s 15. 
98  Keane, 'Arbitration Prospects', above n 86. 
99  Megens and Cubitt, 'Arbitrators' Perspective', above n 91, 5; Peter Megens and Beth Cubitt, 
'Meeting Disputants' Needs in the Current Climate: What Has Gone Wrong With 
Arbitration and How Can We Repair It?' (2009) 28 The Arbitrator and Mediator 115, 129–30. 
100  Australian Granites Ltd v Eisenwerk Hensel Bayreuth Dipl-Ing Burkhardt GmbH [2001] 1 Qd R 
461, 466 [12] (Pincus JA). 
101  The current (2012) version of the ICC Arbitration Rules is available online at International 
Chamber of Commerce, ICC Rules of Arbitration in Several Languages (2012) ICC — The 
World Business Organization <http://www.iccwbo.org/Products-and-Services 
/Arbitration-and-ADR/Arbitration/Rules-of-arbitration/Download-ICC-Rules-of-
Arbitration/ICC-Rules-of-Arbitration-in-several-languages/>. 
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Constitution, and the arbitration would therefore be regulated by the relevant State or 
Territory law.102 
Much has been written about Eisenwerk and the error its reasoning committed in 
treating a choice of procedural rules (clearly foreseen and accommodated by art 19(1) 
of the Model Law) as evidencing an intention to displace the Model Law103 — essentially 
that it 'seemed to conflate' contractually agreed-upon arbitration rules with the 
applicable lex arbitri.104 In doing so, Eisenwerk lacks pro-arbitration judicial policy as 
defined by failing to adopt an internationally minded perspective or a sophisticated 
understanding of international commercial arbitration. It is not the intention or 
purpose of this paper to revisit the question of whether Eisenwerk was rightly decided, 
which has been exhaustively considered in the literature and has been answered with a 
resounding 'no'.105 Rather, what is of contemporary significance are the cases which 
between 2010 and the time of writing have followed — and what is of particular 
interest given current federal government policy is the extent to which their reasoning 
displays evidence of pro-arbitration judicial policy. 
These cases are, of course, only a subset of the (growing) corpus of recent 
Australian arbitration-related case law. For practical reasons, that entire body of case 
law cannot be analysed here. For the purposes of this paper, the Eisenwerk line of cases 
are a useful and interesting illustration of the pro-arbitration judicial policy concept at 
work (or not). They are a self-contained sample of cases running along a consistent 
theme that provide an informative basis for this paper's analysis. 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
102  This constitutional point was discussed in Cargill International SA v Peabody Australia 
Mining Ltd (2010) 78 NSWLR 533, 537–8 [12] (Ward J), and the 'substitution' of the 
Commercial Arbitration Act 1990 (Qld) for the International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) was 
referred to (albeit without explanation as to its constitutional basis) in Wagners Nouvelle 
Caledonie Sarl v Vale Inco Nouvelle Caledonie SAS [2010] QCA 219 (20 August 2010) [32] (Muir 
JA). See generally American Diagnostica Inc v Gradipore Ltd (1998) 44 NSWLR 312, 322–9 
(Giles CJ). 
103  See, eg, Luke Nottage and Richard Garnett, 'Top 20 Things to Change in or Around 
Australia's International Arbitration Act' (2010) 6 Asian International Arbitration Journal 1, 26; 
Stephen Barrett-White and Christopher Kee, 'Enforcement of Arbitral Awards Where the 
Seat of the Arbitration is Australia — How the Eisenwerk Decision Might Still be a Sleeping 
Assassin' (2007) 24 Journal of International Arbitration 515, 523–7; Nick Rudge and Cameron 
Miles, 'More Than an Empty Gesture: The Reversal of Eisenwerk' (2011) 77 Arbitration 43, 43; 
Gordon Smith and Andrew Cook, 'International Commercial Arbitration in Asia-Pacific: A 
Comparison of the Australian and Singapore Systems' (2011) 77 Arbitration 108, 113; 
Megens and Cubitt, 'Arbitrators' Perspective', above n 91, 5; Megens and Cubitt, 'Meeting 
Disputants' Needs', above n 99, 129–30. 
104  Rudge and Miles, above n 103, 43. 
105  See, eg, Björn Gehle, 'The Arbitration Rules of the Australian Centre for International 
Commercial Arbitration' (2009) 13 Vindobona Journal of International Commercial Law and 
Arbitration 251, 256; Justice Clyde Croft and David Fairlie, 'International Commercial 
Arbitration — The New Framework for International Commercial Arbitration in Australia' 
(Paper presented at the International Commercial Arbitration: Efficient, Effective, 
Economical? conference, Melbourne, 4 December 2009) 6. 
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IV THE END OF EISENWERK? — A CASE STUDY IN PRO-
ARBITRATION JUDICIAL POLICY 
In this Part, five cases having a bearing on the continued applicability of Eisenwerk are 
analysed for evidence of this pro-arbitration judicial policy. These cases, handed down 
between 2010 and the time of writing, are: 
 Cargill International SA v Peabody Australia Mining Ltd106 ('Cargill International'); 
 Wagners Nouvelle Caledonie Sarl v Vale Inco Nouvelle Caledonie SAS107 ('Wagners'); 
 Lightsource Technologies Australia Pty Ltd v Pointsec Mobile Technologies AB108 
('Lightsource'); 
 Castel Electronics Pty Ltd v TCL Air Conditioner (Zhongshan) Company Ltd109 
('Castel'); and 
 Rizhao Steel Holding Group Co Ltd v Koolan Iron Ore Pty Ltd110 ('Rizhao Steel'). 
In addition relevant reforms effected through the International Arbitration 
Amendment Act 2010 (Cth) are considered, which are particularly relevant to this Part's 
analysis of Castel and Rizhao Steel. 
A Cargill International — The New South Wales Supreme Court 
Cargill International was a case handed down by Ward J in the Supreme Court of New 
South Wales on 11 August 2010. A partial award had been rendered in an arbitration 
conducted pursuant to an arbitration agreement adopting the ICC Arbitration Rules.111 
The respondent in the arbitration and the plaintiff in the litigation (Cargill 
International) sought to challenge the award, raising bases for doing so under both the 
now-repealed Commercial Arbitration Act 1984 (NSW) s 38(4)(b) and art 34(2)(b)(ii) of 
the Model Law.112 In determining this challenge, Ward J was required to identify which 
regime governed the arbitration,113 and thus to reassess the Queensland Court of 
Appeal's reasoning in Eisenwerk. 
Ward J relevantly held that the parties' arbitration clause was distinguishable from 
the clause in Eisenwerk, but in the event this analysis was wrong, her Honour went on 
to hold that: 
 the parties' arbitration agreement did not enliven the old IAA s 21; and 
 Eisenwerk was plainly wrong and should not be followed.114 
Concluding that the Model Law therefore applied, Ward J ultimately held that the Model 
Law ground of challenge was not made out.115 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
106  (2010) 78 NSWLR 533. 
107  [2010] QCA 219. 
108  (2011) 250 FLR 63. 
109  (2012) 201 FCR 209. 
110  (2012) 43 WAR 91. 
111  Cargill International SA v Peabody Australia Mining Ltd (2010) 78 NSWLR 533, 535–6 [1], 547 
[39]. 
112  Ibid 537 [8]–[10]. 
113  Ibid 537 [8]. 
114  See her Honour's summary of the decision at ibid 542 [31]. 
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A strong sense of pro-arbitration judicial policy can be discerned in Ward J's 
consideration of Eisenwerk. 
In recounting the Eisenwerk principle, the Court concluded that first: 
Eisenwerk stands as authority for the proposition that, by expressly adopting a different 
'form of arbitration' (there, that being the ICC Rules), parties will be taken to have shown 
a sufficient intention not to adopt the form or system of arbitration provided for under 
the Model Law (and that this is sufficient to amount to an opt out agreement for the 
purposes of the [old IAA s 21])116 
and second, that there is a distinction between the procedural rules governing an 
arbitration and the lex arbitri,117 not properly appreciated by Eisenwerk, such that the 
decision was plainly wrong and should not be followed.118 
The pro-arbitration judicial policy underlying this decision can be seen in the 
Court's efforts to reach a conclusion regarding Eisenwerk which paid due regard to the 
Model Law's internal structure119 and which was informed by the relevant academic 
literature. While her Honour emphasised that this literature merely 'confirms the view 
I would in any event have formed',120 a number of local and international 
commentaries concerning Eisenwerk were referred to.121 
Ward J's decision rejects a feature of Australian arbitration jurisprudence which, as 
outlined in Part III above, was widely perceived as undesirable. For example, the then 
federal Attorney-General the Hon Robert McClelland MP remarked in a December 
2009 speech that 'I am sure no one here needs reminding of the impact that the 
Eisenwerk decision has had on Australia's reputation internationally'.122 To this extent, 
it 'demonstrates a mature understanding of international commercial arbitration'123 
and has a pro-arbitration effect consistent with the implementation of pro-arbitration 
judicial policy.124 
B Wagners — The Queensland Court of Appeal 
A very different approach to Eisenwerk was taken by the Queensland Court of Appeal 
in Wagners. That case came before the Court (constituted by McMurdo P, Muir JA and 
White JA) by way of a case stated relating to an existing arbitration, and judgment was 
rendered on 20 August 2010 — just nine days after Cargill International. The case stated 
asked the Court to consider three questions: 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
115  Ibid 545 [31]. Ward J also found that the CAA claim would have been rejected in any event 
— ibid 542–6 [31]. 
116  Ibid 549 [45]. 
117  Ibid 555–8 [68]–[77]. 
118  Ibid 560–1 [84]–[91]. 
119  See especially Model Law arts 19(1), 2(e). 
120  Cargill International SA v Peabody Australia Mining Ltd (2010) 78 NSWLR 533, 560 [83]. 
121  Ibid 558–560 [80]–[83]. 
122  McClelland, 'More Effective and Certain', above n 13. 
123  Monichino, '2010 / 2011 Review', above n 18, 219. 
124  Matt Skinner and Justin Simpkins, 'Enforcement of Foreign Awards in Australia' (2011) 77 
Arbitration 54, 57. See also Megens and Cubitt, 'Emerging Trends', above n 19, 40 — 
suggesting that New South Wales can be characterised as 'a [S]tate which has a progressive 
approach to arbitration'. 
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 whether the parties' arbitration agreement (adopting the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules)125 constituted an opt-out agreement under the old IAA s 21; 
 whether adoption of those Rules (as opposed to the ICC Arbitration Rules) 
distinguished the case from the Eisenwerk 'principle'; and 
 if not, whether Eisenwerk was correctly decided.126 
The parties' motivation for litigating appears to have been their desire to clarify 'the 
applicable supervisory law' so as to support 'the efficacious conduct of the arbitration' 
and to ensure the parties 'know at an early stage of the arbitration their rights of 
judicial review of any award'.127 Cargill International, discussed in Section A above, is a 
good illustration of how these rights of recourse can differ depending on the applicable 
regime. 
Unlike Ward J, the Queensland Court of Appeal was not so ready to declare 
Eisenwerk wrongly decided. Instead, it took a radically different view of the nature of 
the Eisenwerk holding, and confined the decision to its facts. It held that the Eisenwerk 
'principle' was 'in truth, no principle at all'.128 Rather, the Court viewed Eisenwerk's 
conclusion as one relating to the construction of the particular contractual terms at 
issue in that case.129 The Court justified this view by pointing out that conclusions as to 
the construction of contractual terms in one case do not necessarily bind courts in 
future cases even when considering identical terms, given that contractual 
interpretation is a task undertaken in context.130 
Wagners can be viewed as manifestly lacking the pro-arbitration judicial policy 
underpinning Cargill International. The Court treated the key issue as entirely one of 
contractual interpretation. In Muir JA's assessment, 'whether the parties have agreed 
that any dispute between them is to be settled otherwise than in accordance with the 
Model Law depends on the construction of [the arbitration agreement]'.131 While 
contractual interpretation is part of the jigsaw, it is not the only puzzle piece at play. 
Equally, analysing opt out issues under the old IAA s 21 involves the meaning of that 
provision — that is, statutory interpretation. That question is one of law, with relevant 
case law thus carrying precedential effect. The implications of this point were not 
adequately addressed by the Court. In addition, while it is true that contractual 
interpretation is a task undertaken in context, there are areas of the law where 
precedential value is ascribed to the interpretation of contractual terms for policy 
reasons — for example, in construing terms found in insurance contracts. The 
requirements of pro-arbitration judicial policy could arguably dictate a similar 
approach be taken to the construction of arbitration agreements. 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
125  The 1976 version of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules are available online at UNCITRAL, 
International Commercial Arbitration & Conciliation (2012) <http://www. 
uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration.html>. The current version of the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, effective 15 August 2010, is also available from this site. 
126  Wagners Nouvelle Caledonie Sarl v Vale Inco Nouvelle Caledonie SAS [2010] QCA 219 (20 
August 2010) [1] (McMurdo P). 
127  Ibid [4] (Muir JA) (see paragraph [17] of the case stated). 
128  Ibid [42] (Muir JA). 
129  Ibid. 
130  Ibid [43] (Muir JA). 
131  Ibid [31]. 
2013 Pro-Arbitration Policy in Australian Courts — The end of Eisenwerk? 317 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Muir JA downplayed the statutory interpretation issue by noting that the 'intention 
of Parliament' was not 'relevant … except in as much as the relevant intention finds its 
expression in the clear, unambiguous language of [the old IAA] s 21'.132 To this, three 
points can be made. First, one might query whether the old IAA s 21 is as clear and 
unambiguous as suggested, given the diverging approaches taken by different courts 
in Eisenwerk, Cargill International, Wagners and Lightsource (analysed in Section C 
below). Secondly, Megarry J's cautionary words in John v Rees133 seem apposite in this 
context: 
As everybody who has anything to do with the law well knows, the path of the law is 
strewn with examples of open and shut cases which, somehow, were not; of 
unanswerable charges which, in the event, were completely answered; of inexplicable 
conduct which was fully explained; of fixed and unalterable determinations that, by 
discussion, suffered a change.134 
And thirdly, statutory interpretation is inescapably tied up with the notion of pro-
arbitration judicial policy. This was demonstrated in Part II above. In international law, 
the New York Convention must be interpreted in accordance with its pro-enforcement 
bias and more broadly, interpretation of the IAA by Australian courts is legally 
required to occur in accordance with pro-arbitration judicial policy. This is so given the 
new IAA ss 2D and 39 inserted by the International Arbitration Amendment Act 2010 
(Cth), but is also the result that would be required under the purposive approach to 
statutory interpretation enshrined in the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 15AA. 
Thus, some authors describe Wagners as 'arbitration-unfriendly'.135 Megens and 
Cubitt go so far as to suggest that '[o]ne would query why any arbitration practitioner, 
given the choice, would want to have an arbitration seated in Queensland'.136 While 
not in so many words, what these concerns essentially reflect is the decision's lack of 
pro-arbitration judicial policy. However, not all assessments of Wagners have been 
critical. Rudge and Miles suggest that taken together, Cargill International and Wagners 
'will perhaps go some way towards repairing the damage international observers have 
perceived'.137 Whilst acknowledging Wagners did not 'go as far as' Cargill International, 
these authors suggest the decision 'is nevertheless encouraging'138 and that taken 
together with Cargill International the cases 'represent a statement to the international 
arbitral community … that Australia's judiciary is arbitration friendly'.139 
Consequently, Rudge and Miles 'commend these decisions to the reader'.140 
On balance, it is difficult to accept the view that Wagners expresses 'opposition to 
the conclusion drawn … in Eisenwerk'.141 Rather, the decision sidesteps the important 
statutory interpretation dimension of the old IAA s 21's operation, and in doing so 
escapes the need to comment on Eisenwerk's correctness. For this reason, the preferable 
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view is that Wagners fails to evidence the pro-arbitration judicial policy underpinning 
Cargill International. 
C Lightsource — The ACT Supreme Court 
Following the decisions in Cargill International and Wagners, Smith and Cook suggested 
that Eisenwerk had 'not [been] followed in later cases'.142 However, on 12 April 2011, 
Refshauge J handed down the ACT Supreme Court's judgment in Lightsource. This 
decision demonstrated that the end of Eisenwerk had not yet come. 
Lightsource concerned a dispute between Lightsource, an Australian software 
reseller, and Pointsec, a Swedish software developer.143 The parties entered into the 
'PMT Partner Agreement Australia' on 2 October 2003, 'whereby [Pointsec] granted to 
[Lightsource] a non-exclusive, non-transferable right to market and distribute certain 
of [Pointsec's] software products and services in the Australian Capital Territory'.144 
After a dispute arose under the contract, Lightsource commenced ACT Supreme Court 
proceedings on 16 March 2007 alleging unconscionability and unjust enrichment.145 
The parties had included a dispute resolution clause (cl 12.8) in their contract.146 
That clause provided for the arbitration of any disputes in Sweden through the 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, using the SCC Expedited Rules.147 Swedish law was 
the contract's governing law.148 Pointsec sought to have the ACT Supreme Court 
litigation stayed on the basis of this clause.149 It also sought to have service of the 
originating application set aside,150 though as this point turned purely on the 
application of the Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT) it is not considered any further by 
this paper. 
Pointsec's claim that cl 12.8 justified a stay of proceedings was put on four different 
and alternative bases: 
 section 7 of the International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) — which is the domestic 
implementation of the obligation of Australian courts to stay proceedings in the 
face of a valid arbitration agreement contained in art II(3) of the New York 
Convention; 
 article 8 of the Model Law — which is the equivalent provision requiring a stay 
of proceedings found in the Model Law; 
 section 53 of the Commercial Arbitration Act 1986 (ACT) — which provides for 
staying litigation in the context of domestic commercial arbitration; and 
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 the Court's 'inherent power and jurisdiction to stay proceedings before it'.151 
For the purpose of this paper's analysis, the key element of Lightsource relates to its 
application of art 8 of the Model Law. It is the Court's consideration of the Model Law art 
8 argument that caused it to have reference to Eisenwerk and which is also most 
interesting for the purposes of analysing pro-arbitration judicial policy. While the 
Court noted the 'very similar terms' upon which art 8 of the Model Law and IAA s 7 
operated,152 the Court's decision relating to IAA s 7 turned on a contractual 
interpretation issue relating to cl 11.7 of the PMT Partner Agreement Australia.153 With 
respect to the third and fourth alleged bases for a stay, neither raised issues concerning 
international commercial arbitration under which an analysis of pro-arbitration judicial 
policy (or Eisenwerk) becomes relevant. 
Article 8(1) of the Model Law, like IAA s 7(5), contains an exception to the 
requirement of a stay where the arbitration agreement is 'inoperative or incapable of 
being performed'. On the basis of cl 11.7 of the PMT Partner Agreement Australia, this 
was fatal to the IAA s 7 argument.154 The art 8 Model Law argument could have been 
dismissed for the same reason. However, instead, Refshauge J invoked Eisenwerk as the 
reason for the claim's failure.155 
Referring to the old IAA s 21, Refshauge J noted that '[t]he Agreement does not 
expressly so provide' that the Model Law would not apply.156 His Honour also 
acknowledged that '[t]here is no evidence before me that the parties have otherwise so 
agreed'.157 Nonetheless, on the basis of Eisenwerk and the parties' choice of the SCC 
Expedited Rules, the Court held that the parties had impliedly excluded the Model Law. 
In the words of Refshauge J, 'I have perused the [SCC Expedited Rules] and there are 
real differences between [them] and the Model Law'.158 Thus it was held that 'the 
parties have agreed … to proceed other than in accordance with the Model Law'.159 
Consequently, art 8 of the Model Law was held to be inapplicable.160 
This decision is troubling from a pro-arbitration judicial policy perspective. First, it 
does not make any reference to the IAA s 2D statutory objects. This is not just a matter 
of good practice — it is required of courts performing 'functions' or 'exercising … 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
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powers' under the Model Law by IAA ss 39(1)(a)(vi) and (2)(a).161 Making a 
determination under art 8 of the Model Law is apt to be described as a function or an 
exercise of power under the Model Law, thus as a matter of law reference to the IAA s 
2D objects is required. Particularly relevant in this case could have been the objects of 
'facilitat[ing] the use of arbitration agreements'162 and also 'giv[ing] effect to the 
UNCITRAL Model Law'.163 
While the Lightsource judgment was handed down on 12 April 2011, the 
proceedings themselves had been initiated on 16 March 2007 and the stay application 
was heard on 28 May 2008.164 Thus notwithstanding the date of judgment, from a 
practical perspective, Lightsource might be thought of as the first in time in this line of 
five cases and as (in essence) a case pre-dating the International Arbitration Amendment 
Act 2010 (Cth). Even if this perspective is taken and the IAA s 2D issue is put to one 
side, critiques from a pro-arbitration judicial policy perspective remain. For example, 
the decision contains no critical assessment of Eisenwerk. This is surprising given the 
decision's infamy, the close scrutiny it has received in the academic literature, and the 
fact that two Australian superior courts had within the previous 12 months come to 
very different conclusions regarding its precedential value. 
Further, and perhaps most fundamentally, pro-arbitration judicial policy is 
demonstrably lacking in Lightsource given the Court's failure to contextualise the old 
IAA s 21's operation against the sphere of applicability of the Model Law. To 
demonstrate this point, an analysis of that scope is required. Though the analysis is 
technical, had it been undertaken by the Court, the relevance of art 8 of the Model Law 
would not have been dismissed (at least, not for the reasons given); the reach of the old 
IAA s 21 would have been narrowed; and pro-arbitration judicial policy would have 
been furthered. 
Lex arbitri are generally conceived of as being territorial in their application.165 In 
other words, they apply as the baseline procedural law governing an international 
commercial arbitration if that arbitration is seated within the relevant State.166 The 
Model Law operates in this fashion. As a general rule, its application is territorial in the 
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sense that most of its provisions 'apply only if the place of arbitration is in the territory 
of this State'.167 However, art 8 of the Model Law is one of a number of exceptions.168 
Article 8 of the Model Law is thus able to be applied by an Australian court — to refer 
litigating parties back to arbitration — even if the seat of arbitration is not Australia. 
This is a logical consequence of the provision's purpose. Securing compliance with 
arbitration agreements would be frustrated if a party could unilaterally choose to 
litigate outside the arbitral seat with impunity. 
Article 8 of the Model Law, and the other provisions mentioned as exceptions to the 
general rule in art 1(2) of the Model Law, can be viewed as a discrete part of the Model 
Law having operation independent of the Model Law acting as lex arbitri. Thus, should 
the Model Law not apply, these specific provisions must still be able to be invoked by 
an Australian court. This is true where, as is envisaged by art 1(2) of the Model Law, the 
seat of arbitration is outside Australia.169 It is argued here to also be true where, under 
the old IAA s 21, the parties displace the Model Law's application (whether by virtue of 
a genuine agreement or through the operation of Eisenwerk). 
In Lightsource, the seat of arbitration was Sweden and the adoption of the SCC 
Expedited Rules led the Court to invoke the old IAA s 21 (on the basis of Eisenwerk). 
Neither of these facts preclude the operation of art 8 of the Model Law. Applying pro-
arbitration judicial policy, as required by IAA s 39 and a consideration of the IAA s 2D 
statutory objects, should have led the ACT Supreme Court to this conclusion and 
should have led it to assess whether art 8 of the Model Law required a stay (though 
given the Court's decision with respect to IAA s 7, the answer would most likely still 
have been no). 
D Enter the Amendments 
Before considering Castel and Rizhao Steel, the final two cases relevant to Eisenwerk's 
continued applicability, a further factor must be injected into this paper's analysis — 
the legislative reforms effected to the IAA through the International Arbitration 
Amendment Act 2010 (Cth). These reforms directly touch on the Eisenwerk point and 
were the subject of consideration in both Castel and Rizhao Steel, which are analysed in 
Sections E and F below. 
Following the International Arbitration Amendment Act 2010 (Cth), the power of 
parties to opt out of the Model Law has been removed.170 The old IAA s 21, which has 
so far been the focus of analysis in this paper, has been replaced. The new IAA s 21, 
which sits under the heading 'Model Law covers the field', now provides that: 
If the Model Law applies to an arbitration, the law of a State or Territory relating to 
arbitration does not apply to that arbitration. 
This new IAA s 21 is radically different to the old, and effects two distinct policy 
decisions. One is to ensure that all international commercial arbitrations seated in 
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Australia are governed by the Model Law as the relevant lex arbitri.171 Thus opt outs of 
any kind are no longer permitted. The second is to legislatively reverse Eisenwerk.172 If 
opt-outs are no longer possible, the effect of Eisenwerk is nullified as there is no legal 
avenue available for Australian courts to interpret the parties’ choice of arbitration 
rules as being inconsistent with the Model Law. As alluded to by the new heading of 
IAA s 21, this provision effectively operates to create a Commonwealth Constitution s 109 
inconsistency with the State and Territory Uniform Commercial Arbitration Acts173 so far 
as an arbitration falls within the scope of the Model Law — that is, in relation to 
international commercial arbitrations. State and Territory legislation now 
unambiguously operates in the province of domestic commercial arbitration only. 
What remained ambiguous however was the temporal reach of the new IAA s 21. 
Despite quite detailed regulation of the time at which many amending clauses in the 
International Arbitration Amendment Act 2010 (Cth) take effect,174 there is nothing in the 
Act which clarifies the point in time at which the new IAA s 21 is operative.175 Early 
commentary operated on the assumption that the new IAA s 21 would operate only in 
relation to arbitration agreements entered into after the date on which the International 
Arbitration Amendment Act 2010 (Cth) received royal assent176 — being 6 July 2010.177 
However, after further analysis, an important complication was discovered — the 
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spectre of the 'black hole' arbitration.178 If the new IAA s 21 only applies to arbitration 
agreements entered into after 6 July 2010, it is possible that a pre-existing arbitration 
agreement could still (pursuant to the old IAA s 21) exclude the Model Law but at the 
same time not be governed by the relevant State or Territory Commercial Arbitration Act 
as the new State and Territory regimes operate immediately (irrespective of when an 
arbitration agreement is concluded),179 and do not apply to international commercial 
arbitrations.180 Thus, despite enactment of the new IAA s 21, questions remain over the 
continued applicability of the old IAA s 21 (and thus by implication the continued 
applicability of Eisenwerk) where an arbitration agreement was concluded before 6 July 
2010. Statistical data published by the International Chamber of Commerce 
demonstrates that there are often a number of years (sometimes a great number of 
years) between the conclusion of an arbitration agreement and the initiation of 
proceedings,181 confirming the practical importance of this issue. 
E Castel — The Federal Court of Australia 
These questions were explored by the Federal Court of Australia in Castel, a decision 
handed down by Murphy J on 23 January 2012. Castel did not examine the Eisenwerk 
principle per se, though it did address the temporal reach of the new IAA s 21 and in 
doing so indirectly addressed the continued applicability of Eisenwerk. The decision, 
which concerned a challenge to the Federal Court's jurisdiction to enforce a non-
foreign award182 pursuant to the IAA and the Model Law, was based on an application 
of s 39B(1A)(c) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth)183 with Murphy J's analysis of the new 
IAA s 21 strictly constituting obiter dicta.184 Nonetheless, the Court's analysis is 
instructive in the quest to assess whether the end of Eisenwerk has finally come (and the 
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extent to which pro-arbitration judicial policy influenced that result). For the purpose 
of this paper, the decisions of Murphy J following later in 2012 concerning the 
substance of the challenge to recognition and enforcement185 and the orders in the 
proceedings186 will be put to one side, as will the recently delivered High Court 
decision upholding the constitutional validity of the Model Law's implementation 
through the IAA arising out of the case.187 The key point for present purposes is the 
Court's analysis of the temporal operation of the new IAA s 21 in the original 23 
January 2012 decision. 
What is interesting about Castel is that the effect of Murphy J's analysis vis-à-vis 
Eisenwerk is decidedly pro-arbitration, though pro-arbitration judicial policy plays only 
a limited role in the reasoning leading to that result. As to the temporal reach of the 
new IAA s 21, the Court suggested that the provision should be given retrospective 
effect and apply irrespective of when the relevant arbitration agreement was entered 
into.188 Should this obiter dicta opinion be accepted, the result is the complete end of the 
Eisenwerk principle. If the old IAA s 21 is given no lingering residual effect, there is no 
longer any space in which the Eisenwerk principle can operate. 
Notwithstanding its strong pro-arbitration effect, Murphy J's opinion is based on 
rather ordinary principles of statutory interpretation. At the heart of the Court's 
reasoning was a consideration of 'the general presumption in Australian law against 
retrospectivity of legislation, subject to clear contrary intention'.189 This general 
presumption is more precisely defined by the principle that under Australian law, 
substantive laws will be given only prospective effect while procedural laws will be 
given retrospective effect, subject to a contrary legislative intention.190 To this effect, 
Murphy J quoted191 the 'leading case'192 of Maxwell v Murphy in which Dixon CJ 
remarked: 
Perhaps there could be no more practical summary of the principle, which, as was said, 
emerges from the English and Canadian cases, than the following,—'unless the language 
used plainly manifests in express terms or by clear implication a contrary intention—(a) 
A statute divesting vested rights is to be construed as prospective. (b) A statute, merely 
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procedural, is to be construed as retrospective. (c) A statute which, while procedural in its 
character, affects vested rights adversely is to be construed as prospective.'193 
On the approach of Murphy J, assessing the temporal reach of the new IAA s 21 was 
simply a matter of determining whether it was procedural or substantive in nature, 
and then asking whether Parliament had evidenced an intention to displace the 
relevant general rule.194 In answer to the first question, Murphy J argued that 
'[d]ealing as it does with arbitral law, the current s 21 should be construed as 
procedural and therefore retrospective'.195 Turning to the second question, it was 
suggested that 'the available indications point to a Parliamentary intention that the 
current s 21 be given immediate effect upon enactment'.196 
The main evidence of pro-arbitration judicial policy in Murphy J's reasoning lies in 
his Honour's contextual analysis of whether a contrary Parliamentary intention 
displaced the general rule of retrospectivity. Three elements of this reasoning might be 
described as pro-arbitration in nature. First, Murphy J rejected the argument that IAA s 
30 required the new IAA s 21 to be given a prospective interpretation. That provision 
establishes the following rule: 
This Part [which includes IAA s 21] does not apply in relation to an international 
commercial arbitration between parties to an arbitration agreement that was concluded 
before the commencement of this Part … 
According to Murphy J, 'the "commencement of this Part" referred to in s 30 is 
intended to mean the commencement of Pt III as then enacted by the 1989 Act'197 
rather than involving a section-by-section application of the saving provision.198 Pro-
arbitration judicial policy is evidenced in the Court's commercially-flavoured 
consideration of the impracticality that the alternative construction would involve — 
'[s]uch a result would make it very difficult for people affected by the [IAA] and Model 
Law to understand the applicability of its provisions' and 'Parliament said nothing to 
indicate that it intended this strange result'.199 
Secondly, Murphy J's opinion is supported by reference to the International 
Arbitration Amendment Act 2010 (Cth)'s Explanatory Memorandum200 and Second 
Reading Speech.201 Both documents are framed around the federal government's pro-
arbitration policy platform identified in Part II; it was the then Attorney-General, the 
Hon Robert McClelland MP, who drove this policy and initiated the 2008 review of the 
IAA. And thirdly, Murphy J's opinion takes account of the effective interaction of the 
IAA with the Commercial Arbitration Act 2011 (Vic). Relating the new IAA s 21 issue to 
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the core dispute over the jurisdiction in relation to art 35 of the Model Law to enforce a 
non-foreign award, the Court noted that the Commercial Arbitration Act 2011 (Vic) does 
not apply, leading Murphy J to remark 'I very much doubt that the Federal, State and 
Territory parliaments intend the result that no court is specified as "competent" to do 
so [ie. exercise jurisdiction to enforce non-foreign international arbitral awards]'.202 
F Rizhao Steel — The Western Australian Court of Appeal 
On 9 March 2012, shortly after the jurisdictional decision in Castel, the Western 
Australian Court of Appeal delivered its judgment in Rizhao Steel. In that case, Rizhao 
Steel challenged the Supreme Court's decision at first instance to enforce arbitral 
awards that had been made against it in favour of Koolan Iron Ore Pty Ltd and Mount 
Gibson Mining Ltd.203 The case raised jurisdictional issues as to whether the 
Commercial Arbitration Act 1985 (WA) or alternatively the IAA provided the legal basis 
for the enforcement order.204 It was 'common ground' prior to the Court of Appeal 
proceedings that the Commercial Arbitration Act 1985 (WA) applied.205 However, on 
appeal, Rizhao Steel argued that an enforcement order could only be made under the 
IAA. The Court of Appeal 'was thus faced with the same question as in Castel: does the 
new [IAA] s 21 apply to pre-6 July 2010 arbitration agreements?'206 A peculiar feature 
of Rizhao Steel which differentiated it factually from Castel was that the relevant 
arbitration agreement pre-dated 6 July 2010, but so did commencement of the 
arbitration — with proceedings almost being concluded by that date.207 The case was 
ultimately decided on the procedural basis that it was not open to Rizhao Steel to 
argue a new point (previously withheld for forensic advantage) on appeal.208 
Nevertheless, like Murphy J in Castel, the Court went on to analyse the IAA s 21 issue 
in obiter dicta.209 
Two distinct strands of reasoning are evident in the Court's judgments. Martin CJ, 
Buss JA and Murphy JA:  
all … agreed that the amended s 21 did not have retrospective effect where the dispute 
had been referred to arbitration prior to 6 July 2010 pursuant to a pre-6 July 2010 
arbitration agreement in which the parties had selected the CAA as their lex arbitri.210  
However, 'the court was divided as to whether the new [IAA] s 21 applied to a pre-
6 July 2010 arbitration agreement where arbitration proceedings had not been 
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commenced prior to the introduction of the new [IAA] s 21'.211 Martin CJ (with Buss JA 
agreeing)212 suggested that the operation of the new IAA s 21 was not retrospective in 
such a case,213 'contrary to the finding of Murphy J in Castel'.214 On Martin CJ and Buss 
JA's view, the new IAA s 21 is not retrospective in all cases and by implication, scope 
remains for the continued applicability of Eisenwerk. Murphy JA suggested that the 
new IAA s 21's operation might be retrospective where the arbitration itself was 
commenced after 6 July 2010.215 This view implies a more limited scope for the 
continued operation of Eisenwerk remains. 
As in Castel, both strands of opinion were grounded in ordinary domestic principles 
of statutory interpretation. Like Murphy J in Castel, Martin CJ referred to Maxwell v 
Murphy,216 describing it as the 'classical exposition' of the relevant principles.217 Martin 
CJ's opinion was essentially based on the premise that despite 'characterisation of the 
law as procedural', it 'is also necessary to assess the effect which the change in the law 
has upon vested rights'218 — and that the parties' contractual rights with respect to 
their chosen mode of dispute settlement vested at the time their arbitration agreement 
was concluded.219 Support for this approach was drawn from the Acts Interpretation 
Act 1901 (Cth) s 7(2)(c), concerning rights and obligations accrued or incurred under 
repealed legislation.220 
The point on which Murphy JA differed was his Honour's assessment of whether 
the procedural rights conferred under the old IAA s 21 vested prior to the 
commencement of arbitral proceedings. His Honour explicitly adverted to the fact that 
'[t]hese appeals do not call for a determination of the effect of the repeal and 
substitution of s 21 with respect to agreements under which the parties had not 
referred their disputes at the time of the commencement of the Amendment Act'.221 
Nevertheless, the point was discussed in the final paragraph of the Court's decision 
where Murphy JA suggested: 
The situation may be different with respect to disputes not referred to arbitration prior to 
6 July 2010. In that event, the arbitration agreement would be wholly executory, and the 
rights under the agreement to have any particular dispute settled by arbitration in 
accordance with its terms would arguably not have vested. As I have said, it appears to 
me that the contractual right was, in effect, to refer disputes to an arbitration to be 
governed by the Commercial Arbitration Act as it stood at the time of the referral. If, 
between the date of the arbitration agreement and the date of referral, the Commercial 
Arbitration Act had been modified directly by the Parliament of Western Australia, or by 
yielding to the operation of inconsistent Commonwealth legislation, it might be difficult 
to contend that there was a relevant accrued right which would invoke the principles of 
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statutory construction concerning retrospectivity. That point is, however, not necessary to 
decide in this case.222 
While the pro-arbitration judicial policy features of Castel were limited, the Rizhao 
Steel Court's analysis was even more domestically-focused. It is difficult to detect any 
elements of Martin CJ's leading judgment or Murphy JA's additional remarks that 
flavour the Court's reasoning with pro-arbitration judicial policy. In particular, Martin 
CJ considered that the extrinsic materials relied upon in Castel were not of any 
assistance223 and also 'rejected' the contextual relevance of IAA s 30.224 Nevertheless, 
commentary has recognised the intuitive appeal of Murphy JA's approach, with 
Monichino and Fawke arguing that it 'is to be preferred (to the view of the majority, 
and also to the view in Castel), from both a statutory interpretation and a policy 
perspective'.225 
V LESSONS LEARNED — THE PLACE OF PRO-ARBITRATION 
JUDICIAL POLICY IN THE AUSTRALIAN COURTS 
What can be learned from this paper's analysis? With respect to Eisenwerk, the best 
conclusion that can be drawn on the current state of the authorities is that the infamous 
principle has possibly come to an end. In Cargill International the Court, constituted by 
Ward J, expressly said as much — holding that Eisenwerk was 'plainly wrong' and 
should not be followed in New South Wales.226 Nonetheless, the authorities do not all 
point in the one direction. The Queensland Court of Appeal's own reconsideration of 
the decision in Wagners was far more equivocal, and Eisenwerk was applied by the ACT 
Supreme Court in Lightsource. Irrespective of Eisenwerk's correctness, the Federal Court 
of Australia's interpretation of the new IAA s 21 in Castel forecloses any further effect 
for the principle, though Rizhao Steel's analysis differed. It must further be kept in 
mind that Castel and Rizhao Steel's analyses of the new IAA s 21 were obiter dicta 
only.227 
As established in Part II, pro-arbitration judicial policy is a required element of legal 
reasoning when applying the IAA and is also a requirement at international law with 
respect to the New York Convention's pro-enforcement bias. It is interesting to observe 
that the two decisions analysed in Part IV imposing the greatest obstacles for 
Eisenwerk's continued applicability — Cargill International and Castel — do display 
evidence of pro-arbitration judicial policy (the former moreso than the latter). 
Conversely, Wagners and Lightsource lack a solid pro-arbitration judicial policy focus 
and unsurprisingly are two decisions that fail to create distance from the Eisenwerk 
holding. 
While the pro-arbitration effect of a judgment is necessarily a different concept to 
the use of pro-arbitration judicial policy, in four of the five cases analysed in Part IV 
the two coincide. Those Courts making use, as the law requires, of pro-arbitration 
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judicial policy (as that term is defined in this paper) delivered judgments with a pro-
arbitration effect, and which were consistent with the federal government's pro-
arbitration policy platform outlined in Part II. 
VI CONCLUSION 
International arbitration is market driven, in that parties have a choice in terms of the 
jurisdictions in which they commence proceedings. If the legal system in Australia does 
not provide an attractive environment in which international arbitrations can occur, the 
parties may simply opt to go elsewhere.228 
Analysing the extent of pro-arbitration judicial policy evident in Australian arbitration-
related case law is an interesting but not merely academic exercise. As outlined in Part 
II, not only has the federal government adopted a policy platform supportive of 
international commercial arbitration, but pro-arbitration judicial policy is a legitimate 
element of (and legal requirement in) judicial reasoning. As it is a legal requirement, it 
is an important factor in Australian courts reaching legally 'correct' decisions. It is also 
potentially important in securing the consistent interpretation of the IAA as required 
by the High Court's statement of principle in Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty 
Ltd.229 
Realisation of a consistent pro-arbitration judicial policy approach in Australian 
case law can best be described as a work-in-progress. This is evident in this paper's 
assessment of the five recent cases in the Eisenwerk line. For this reason it has been 
observed with respect to the case law more generally that '[d]espite Australia's 
adoption of the [Model Law] in 1989 and other efforts, we have not yet succeeded in 
developing Australia even as a major arbitral venue in our region'.230 As noted by 
Megens and Cubitt, '[l]egislative reform by itself will not suffice' — rather 'all 
participants in arbitration must make a concerted effort'.231 This suggestion 
encapsulates the importance of a supportive judiciary in promoting arbitration within 
Australia, through the means of pro-arbitration judicial policy. As Doug Jones 
(President of the Australian Centre for International Commercial Arbitration) has 
recently suggested, '[e]ven in jurisdictions that, on paper, have progressive arbitration 
laws, the attitude of the courts will play an essential role in shaping the legal 
environment in which the arbitration operates'.232 
Parties to commercial contracts which incorporate arbitration agreements 
ultimately have a wide array of choices in selecting an arbitral seat. With respect to 
ICC arbitration in 2012, 92 cities in 59 different States were selected as arbitral seats233 
— 'ICC arbitrations can be (and are) seated almost anywhere in the world'.234 As noted 
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by Jones, since '[t]he national courts of the arbitral seat have the potential to impact 
significantly upon the arbitral process', '[s]electing an arbitral seat where the local 
courts are friendly to arbitration is fundamental in ensuring a smooth arbitral 
process'.235 This 'need for a supportive judicial system' is a factor 'common to all 
arbitrations' and one which should be given 'consideration' in seat selection.236 
If the arbitration-related decisions of courts in a particular jurisdiction (such as 
Australia) do not evidence the pro-arbitration judicial policy which Part II established 
is required, it may be that parties to arbitration agreements will (in the words of Chief 
Justice Marilyn Warren) 'go elsewhere'.237 Such an outcome would be bad for the 
arbitration market in Australia; contrary to the correct principles for interpreting and 
applying the IAA and the New York Convention; contrary to securing 'correct' decisions 
under those instruments; and frustrating of the federal government's policy platform 
in support of international commercial arbitration in Australia. 
Assessment of whether Australian arbitration-related judgments evidence pro-
arbitration judicial policy was undertaken by this paper with reference to the five cases 
handed down between 2010 and the present time which have a bearing on the 
Eisenwerk principle's continued applicability. However, it is a question worthy of 
examination throughout the corpus of Australian international commercial arbitration 
jurisprudence. Many other significant international commercial arbitration-related 
decisions have been handed down by Australian courts in recent years including the 
High Court challenge to Australia's implementation of the Model Law,238 the first 
instance,239 appeal240 and costs241 decisions in Altain Khuder, and the broader 
discussion of arbitration issues undertaken in Lightsource.242 By extension, a similar 
enquiry could also be carried out with respect to case law concerning the various State 
and Territory (domestic) Commercial Arbitration Acts, such as the Court of Appeal243 
and High Court244 decisions in Gordian Runoff. Much has been written about these 
decisions' pro- or anti-arbitration effects.245 A thorough analysis of the pro-arbitration 
judicial policy implications of these cases' reasoning was not possible within the 
confines of this paper, and thus no comment is made in this regard. However, such an 
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analysis would be a useful further contribution to the body of literature comprising 
Australia's commercial arbitration discourse. 
The assessment undertaken in this paper is also necessarily a continuing process. 
Litigation related to international commercial arbitrations seated both in Australia and 
abroad continues to come before the courts. Australia's competition with Singapore 
and Hong Kong for a greater share of the regional arbitration market is ongoing. The 
way in which pro-arbitration judicial policy is evidenced in future decisions of the 
Australian courts, both relating to the Eisenwerk principle and of broader effect, will be 
watched with interest. 
 
  
 
